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I. INTRODUCTION
"There is no question in my mind that unmanned
vehicles will play an increasingly important role...."
Dr. Edward Teller (1982, 73)
There are gaps in the intelligence network that can be
partly filled by unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). It is now
possible to develop UAVs that can operate at sea, collect
high-resolution imagery, and data-link that intelligence to
the officer in tactical command (OTC) in real-time. This
thesis will show that such UAVs are needed, that they are
plausible, and in high threat areas, their use would be cost
effective
.
A. THE NEED FOR UAVS
Today, long range, highly accurate weapons are already
in the inventory and more advanced-technology weapons are
planned. But with the capability to conduct strikes over
long ranges comes the need for highly reliable, timely
intelligence. In order to maximize the capabilities of long
range cruise missiles, precise classification, targeting and
battle damage assessment (BDA) are needed—accurate weapons
are of little value unless the commander knows where the
enemy is. UAVs capable of relaying imagery intelligence





UAVs to Supplement National IMINT Assets
In time of war, national imagery assets almost
certainly will be overburdened with tasking. The enemy
undoubtedly will put great emphasis on disrupting and
interdicting the handful of intelligence assets and their
associated command, control, communication, and Intelligence
(C 3 I) systems. The tactical UAVs now under development
will place under the command of the OTC the means of
gathering high-resolution imagery without relying on
nationally tasked sensors, or risking a manned
reconnaissance aircraft. It would seem prudent for the U.S.
Navy to equip the fleet with an intelligence asset to fill
in the gaps that may exist in wartime.
2. UAVs in a War-At -Sea Scenario
In the heat of battle, the commander must be able to
assess his adversary's strengths and weaknesses.
Intelligence must be quick, accurate and unambiguous.
Existing organic support aircraft (especially helicopters)
are becoming increasingly vulnerable to enemy air defenses,
and are unable to provide real-time imagery intelligence.
In cases where rules of engagement are restrictive,
precise real-time classification, targeting, and BDA would
be extremely valuable, especially in high traffic areas such
as the Mediterranean, Persian Gul£, and sea Lanes around the
world. (U.S. Navy 1987, 1)
3 . Using UAVs To Conserve Aircraft
In a general war UAVs would free tactical aircraft
for other missions and allow them to avoid the most
dangerous reconnaissance missions. A major war may be
fought with only those weapons on hand at the beginning of
the conflict. If this is the case, it will be most
important to avoid risking aircraft and crews unnecessarily.
UAVs would give the commander the option of risking a lower
cost platform, while using the more valuable manned aircraft
on missions for which they are optimized. The Grumman F-14A
was designed and purchased as an air superiority fighter,
not as a reconnaissance aircraft. Considering the anti-air
threat, the most cost-effective employment of fighter
aircraft would be in anti-air warfare (AAW), not
reconnaissance
.
When the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) Commander orders
a manned reconnaissance aircraft to reconnoiter enemy held
territory, there is an unavoidable risk that the aircraft
and crew will be lost. UAVs can help solve this. Unmanned
air vehicles could provide high-resolution imagery,
comparable in quality to that collected by nationally tasked
assets or F-14As equipped with tactical aerial
reconnaissance Pod system (TARPS), and free tactical
aircraft from the dangerous reconnaissance missions.
4 . The Prospects for Stealth Technology
Some argue that stealth (reconnaissance) aircraft
will be invulnerable and therefore make UAVs unnecessary.
It is likely that stealth aircraft will be extremely
valuable, as well as costly, assets. Even if low-observable
aircraft are virtually invulnerable to air defenses, it is
anticipated that the optimal use of those limited assets
will be in conducting strikes rather than collecting
intelligence. If this is so, it will be necessary to employ
them in the missions for which they are optimized.
UAVs were among the earliest platforms to Incorporate
stealth technology. According to project manager Robert R.
Schwanhausser , the Ryan model 147A repeatedly eluded Air
Defense Command radars and interceptors during its
operational test and evaluation in 1962. This was
accomplished by covering the 27 foot-long UAV with radar
blankets to minimize the radar cross section. (Wagner 1982,
37)
More recently, cruise missiles such as the General
Dynamics Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) have incorporated
stealth concepts. Cruise missiles are inherently small
targets, so the engineering challenge of applying stealth
technology is not as great as for larger aircraft. (Sweetman
1985b, 1259)
If stealth concepts can be applied to cruise
missiles, then it would seem logical that today's
low-observable technology could be applied to UAVs.
5. Using UAV3 When Politico Are a Factor
in this era of "violent peace" the U.S. Navy is
called upon to deploy forces to areas of conflict on short
notice. Lebanon, Libya, Grenada and the Persian Gulf remind
us that the Navy is directed to take military action but to
avoid inflicting civilian casualties. When there is so much
media attention focused on the military, OTCs should
anticipate being required to carry out surgical strikes, but
without suffering casualties or having any personnel
captured. Under these circumstances UAVs would be an ideal
platform for conducting pre- and post-strike reconnaissance.
One lesson learned in the strikes on Lebanon and
Libya is that Third World nations are often armed with
significant air defense systems. This, when coupled
with the increasing unacceptability of having American
aircrews captured and held in enemy hands, forces us to
reconsider the aerial intelligence problem. (Harris 1987,
101) One sure way to avoid combat loss or capture of
aircrew is to use unmanned vehicles. Equipped with the
General Dynamics Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System
(ATARS) sensors now under development, UAVs could gather
high-resolution Imagery and thus preclude the need for F-14A
TARPS overflights.
The political profile raised by the loss of a manned
reconnaissance aircraft is much higher than it would be for
a downed UAV. The manned reconnaissance aircraft draws
unwanted publici ty--the capture of Francis Gary Powers in
May 1960 gained worldwide media exposure and caused the
cancellation of further Lockheed U-2 flights over the
U.S.S.R. In April 1965, the Peoples' Republic of China put
three U.S. Ryan model 147B photo-reconnaissance UAVs (a
variant of the BQM-34 Firebee) on display in Peking. In
contrast to the U-2 incident, the U.S. was able to simply
ignore the incident. The Chinese could claim whatever they
wanted, but they did not have a captured American "spy
pilot" as evidence. They did have the aircraft and its
nameplates, but those items received nowhere near the amount
of public attention as would an American pilot in prison.
(Wagner 1982, 78)
6. Using UAVs to Save Lives
Over 5,000 Americans lost their lives in the Vietnam
War because their aircraft were shot down or crashed due to
malfunctions. Among the most dangerous missions were the
reconnaissance flights. Additionally, 90% of the Americans
who became prisoners of war were downed pilots or crewmen.
Considering the number of crewmen lost, the use of RPVs
looks even better. During the conflict in Southeast Asia,
RPVs flew more than 3,000 missions over North Vietnam,
China, Laos and elsewhere, with an attrition rate of less
than 10%. (Schemmer 1982)
Because of these figures, many reconnaissance pilots
became firm believers in RPVs. To evaluate the
effectiveness of North Vietnam's newly installed SA-2
Guidelines, the Air Force scheduled a dual U-2/RPV mission.
The U-2 pilot witnessed the SA-2 consume the drone. This
ended the U-2/RPV rivalry: the reconnaissance pilot simply
said, "From now on, you guys can have that mission."
(Wagner 1982, 99)
B. PLAUSABILITY OF UAVs
After the Vietnam War, the U.S. military reduced its
RPV programs in favor of manned aircraft, saying that the
RPVs did not perform as well as manned aircraft. The
navigational accuracy of the Ryan model 147 (AQM-34) UAVs
was limited to one nautical mile per hour of flight time by
the Litton inertial navigation system. (Wagner 1982,
21) This inaccuracy resulted in difficulties in
reconstructing the missions to correlate the intelligence
gathered and the ground track. Israel, however, aggressively
pursued its UAV programs.
The Israeli investment in UAVs was rewarded in June
1982, during the invasion of Lebanon. The relatively
inexpensive and simple Tadrial Mastiff and Israel Aircraft
Industries (IAI) Scouts were successfully employed in
the Bekaa Valley. The UAVs, equipped with TV cameras and
real-time data-links, were used to locate Syrian SAM sites,
with this information, Israeli aircraft fired
anti-radiation missiles to destroy the SAM's radars. With
the air defense sites blinded, strike aircraft were able to
conduct cleanup operations as the UAVs conducted battle
damage assessment and monitored the movement o£ Syrian
forces. (Gwynne 1987, 40)
Reconnaissance UAVs have proven their value in combat
in Vietnam and the Middle East, but should they be deployed
with the fleet? The Navy believes so. It has issued a
request for proposals for a medium range (MR) unmanned air
vehicle capable of providing day and night reconnaissance
and targeting to the OTC in real- or near-real time. The
MR UAV will complement the Pioneer 1 short range unmanned
air vehicle made by the AAI Corporation of Baltimore. The
Pioneer has conducted day and night operations and
demonstrated its television and Forward-Looking Infrared
(FLIR) sensors.
C. COST EFFECTIVENESS OF UAVs
Any attempt in this thesis to quantify the cost
effectiveness of UAVs is almost certain to leave out
significant factors. The fact remains, however, that the
cost of a UAV equipped with a sensor capable of relaying
high-resolution imagery in real-time will be much lower than
the cost of a tactical aircraft such as the F-14A TARPS--
the stronger the enemy air defense system, the more cost
effective the UAV when compared to the manned aircraft.
obviously, the higher the probability that the
reconnaissance platform will be lost to enemy fire, or the
greater the cost difference between the UAV and a manned
aircraft, the more attractive the UAV looks.
Considering that the cost of an MR UAV may be
approximately one million dollars, and the cost of an F/A-18
(being considered for the reconnaissance role) is in excess
of twenty-five million dollars, it is clear that it would
take the loss of more than two dozen UAVs to begin to
approximate the cost of a single manned F/A-18
reconnaissance aircraft. The figures are even more dramatic
for the much more expensive F-14 (the F-14D being priced
above seventy million dollars).
Even if the cost of a UAV system were just as expensive
as a manned aircraft system, the fact that it gives the
commander the option of not risking a manned aircraft,
may justify the expense. Political costs-- imposs ible to
quantify--f unction as a significant factor. The commander
may well be informed that the mission will be considered a
failure if any crewmen are lost. If this were the case, the
commander would find UAVs to be a most valuable addition to
his list of options.
D. DEFINITION OF TERMS
There are differences in terminology and performance
parameters for UAVs among U.S., NATO, and other European
nations, so this paper will use the definitions of terms set
forth by the U.S. Office of Naval Research.
The term "unmanned air vehicle" may be subdivided into
three categories: pllotless target aircraft (PTA) more
commonly referred to as "target drones;"
preprogrammed/autonomous air vehicles which do not require
midcourse guidance; and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs)
which do require commands from a ground or air controller
(Figure 1). An RPV may offer a preprogrammed mode, but has
the capability of being controlled in-flight. RPVs may be
further subdivided by type: fixed wing, rotary wing,




1. PTA--Pilotless Target Aircraft
2. Preprogrammed/Autonomous Air Vehicle
3. RPV--Remotely Piloted Aircraft (Airborne)
a. Fixed Wing RPV
b. Rotary Wing RPV
c. V/STOL--Vertical/Short Take-off and
Landing RPV
d. Autogyro RPV
e. LTA—Lighter Than Air RPV
Figure 1. Categories of UAVs
UAVs also may be described according to their operating
range. Those capable of ranges less than 100 nautical miles
(NM) are characterized as being short range; medium range is
defined as 100 to 300 NM; long range is beyond 300 NM
(Figure 2). (Coburn 1986, D-2)
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RANGE -
SHORT < 100 NM
MEDIUM 100 - 300 NM
LONG > 300 NM
Figure 2. Definition of UAV Range
UAVs operating at speeds between 50 and 150 knots are
defined as being capable of low speed; those with maximum
speeds of between 150 and 350 knots are capable of medium
speed; high speed is defined as greater than 350 knots
(Figure 3). (Coburn 1986, D-2)
SPEED -
LOW 50 - 150 KNOTS
MEDIUM 150 - 350 KNOTS
HIGH > 350 KNOTS
Figure 3. Definition of UAV Speed
Endurance of less than two hours is defined as being
short; between two and five hours is medium; and UAVs
capable of more than five hours are defined as long
endurance (Figure 4). (Coburn 1986, D-2)
ENDURANCE -
SHORT < 2 HOURS
MEDIUM 2-5 HOURS
LONG > 5 HOURS
Figure 4. Definition of UAV Endurance
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II. BACKGROUND
"In January, 1984, the fleet commander off Lebanon . .
.
made it very clear that he saw an immediate need for RPVs .
"
Rear Admiral Ronald Marryott
Office of the Deputy CNO for
Plans, Policy and Operations
(Klass 1984, 44)
The U.S. Navy has been investigating the feasibility of
using unmanned aircraft to avoid risking the pilot since
Elmer Sperry, inventor of the gyroscope, proposed an
unmanned airplane designed to fly a pre-set heading and dive
at a preset range. Navy Lieutenant T.S. Wilkinson,
representing the Bureau of Ordnance, observed the test of
the unpiloted airplane on September 12, 1916, Although
Wilkinson was impressed, he did not consider the weapon
accurate enough to attack ships. Navy interest continued,
however, and on October 17, 1918 a modified N-9 training
plane made a successful unmanned flight. It flew a preset
heading until its fuel was exhausted, at approximately
seventy miles range. The unmanned aircraft's gyro
maintained its course within two degrees of the planned
track. Interest in the project dwindled as the Navy
discovered that the pilotless plane could not be set to fly
at altitudes low enough to attack ships, nor was it accurate
enough. (Friedman 1985, 215)
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Development o£ RPVs was minimal in the inter -war years,
except in the area of target drones. Nevertheless, in July
1940, with World War II on the horizon, the Navy drone
squadron (VJ-3) demonstrated that an unmanned air vehicle
could be controlled from a distance to attack a target. By
August 1941 the control range had been increased to six
miles, using a television camera aboard the RPV. The
television had the advantage that the control pilots did not
have to keep the RPV in visual contact. Under project
"Fox/' on April 9, 1942, a television-guided RPV made a
successful test torpedo run against the destroyer USS Aaron
Ward ( DD 483). Later that month, a television-guided BG-1
RPV dove into a target. Tests of the remotely piloted
vehicles were successful enough for the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral F.J. Home, to ask for 3000 drones.
Nine' RPV squadrons were formed by January 1944, but by that
time, carrier aircraft were winning the air war, and the
perceived need for unconventional attack aircraft
diminished. (Friedman 1985, 216)
Before the program was eliminated, RPVs were used in
combat. In June 1944, RPVs were used to attack the beached
Japanese freighter Yamazukl Maru, at Cape Esperance. And on
September 17, 1944 a plastic TDR-1 RPV, made by Interstate,
was used to attack a beached antiaircraft ship at Khill,
South Bougainville. The attack was reportedly quite
13
success£ul--the RPVs small size made it a difficult target
for anti-aircraft gunners. (Friedman 1985, 216)
In 1944, the same technology was applied to convert worn
out B-17 Flying Fortress and Army Air Force/Navy B-24/PB4Y
Liberator bombers into unmanned air vehicles. They were
loaded with explosives, their pilots parachuted to safety
once the plane was airborne, and a trailing plane, usually a
B-34/PV-1 Ventura, guided the plane to the target. This
program led to the successful attack on Heligoland on
September 3, 1944. (Fitzsimons 1979, 2242)
During the Korean War, remotely controlled F6F
Hellcats, each armed with a 2000 pound bomb, were catapulted
from the USS Boxer ( CV 21) on one-way missions against
heavily defended targets. The RPVs were controlled from
Douglas AD-2D Skyraiders, with television used for terminal
guidance. The Hellcat RPVs suffered from several drawbacks:
they required 30 minutes of servicing before takeoff, during
which time the right wing was required to be unfolded so
that the television camera could be Installed; the ship was
required to maintain a steady course to permit the RPVs
gyro-stabilizer to be checked; and the RPV was considered
vulnerable to groundfire because its control system was
relatively easy to disable. (Friedman 1985, 227)
A. NEW INTEREST IN RPVS--RECONNAI SSANCE
strike missions are not the only flights which endanger
crews. Reconnaissance flights, even In peacetime, can also
14
be extremely hazardous. On May 1, I960, Francis Gary
Powers' U-2 was shot down over the U.S.S.R. This, along
with the loss of Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr. when his U-2
was shot down over Cuba during the missile crisis of October
1962, stimulated the U.S. government to initiate an urgent
program to develop RPVs capable of supplementing the limited
number of manned reconnaissance aircraft. (GAO 1981, 1)
Within ninety days of the loss of the U-2 over Cuba,
the Ryan Aeronautical Company produced its first
reconnaissance RPV, the model 147, based on the Firebee
target drone. During their operational test and evaluation,
staged from McDill Air Force Base (AFB) near Tampa, the
model 147s were able to make repeated penetrations of the
U.S. air defense net without being detected. (Wagner 1982,
35-41)
B. RPVs OVER VIETNAM AND CHINA
RPVs were used extensively between 1964 and 1975 to
collect imagery and electronic intelligence, conduct
electronic countermeasures, fly decoy missions and even drop
propaganda leaflets. (Wagner 1982, 213)
The vast majority of reconnaissance missions were
carried out by the highly classified family of Ryan model
147s (AQM-34). The 147s, based out of Kadena Air Base on
Okinawa, were used extensively to gather intelligence over
the People's Republic of China, starting with the "Blue
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Springs" program in 1964 and abruptly ending in 1971 as a
consequence of President Nixon's diplomatic overtures to
China (Reed 1979, 75). These missions came to light in
November 1964, when the People's Republic of China claimed
it had shot down an unmanned American "high-altitude
reconnaissance military plane" over central China. Although
the Chinese did have the aircraft, the U.S. did not
acknowledge responsibility for the vehicle and the incident
did not draw the same public attention as did the Gary
Powers capture. (Wagner 1982, 77-78)
The vast majority of the operational RPV flights in the
Far East were carried out by the 100th Strategic
Reconnaissance Wing (SRW), operating out of Bien Hoa Air
Force Base, South Vietnam. The General Accounting Office
reports
:
Flying over 3,000 sorties, with an attrition rate of
less than 10 percent, [RPVsl were primarily used for
photographing targets for air attack, recording damage
after bombing, and even discovering unsuspected key
targets like the huge North Vietnamese fuel storage areas
in a suburb of Hanoi.
The RPVs flew over North Vietnam at both high and
low levels, relying on their speed and small size to
elude the heavy and effective North Vietnamese defenses.
(GAO 1981, 1-2)
In April 1972, Dr. John Lucas, Under Secretary of the
Air Force, remarked on the RPVs used in Vietnam: "The
successful development of drones for aerial photography had
added significantly to our reconnaissance and surveillance
capabllty." (Wagner 1982, 208)
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General John C. Meyer, Commander o£ the Strategic Air
Command was quoted in November 19 72:
Drones ... have been doing low altitude Reconnaissance
flying over heavily defended areas of North Vietnam.
The disadvantage of using drones this way is that we
lose a lot of them. The loss rate is higher but we are
willing to risk more of them, and they save lives.
(Wagner 1982, 208)
Another advantage of using RPVs to conduct
reconnaissance in Vietnam was that they could fly at low
altitude, under the weather, to photograph their targets.
During December 1972, the Northeast monsoon usually resulted
in ceilings of 2,000 to 3,000 feet. Admiral Thomas H.
Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed
Congress on the results of the December bombings of Hanoi.
When questioned about the source of the photographs, Moorer
answered
:
We are using drones.... That was the reason I showed you
more than one picture of the same target because the
drones are so close to it that they cannot get all the
target in one photograph. (Wagner 1982, 201-202)
The 100th SRW launched and controlled the RPVs from
Lockheed DC-130 Hercules aircraft, and adapted Sikorsky CH-3
helicopters to recover the vehicles in mid-air, as they
decended by parachute (see chapter III). The Mid-air
Retrieval System (MARS) was not very successful at first-
only half of the attempts were accomplished. However, once
the techniques were perfected the success rate rose sharply.
(Reed 1979, 63) There were 2745 MARS attempts in Southeast
C*
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Asia, of which 2655 were successful, which translates to a
96.7% success rate (Wagner 1982, 109).
RPVs did not gain a good reputation for themselves in
Southeast Asia. They required relatively complex operating
procedures— launch from a DC-130 and MARS recovery. The
RPVs navigation system was not very accurate, so It was
often difficult during post-flight analysis to correlate the
intelligence gathered with the path actually flown. The
attrition rate was high, and this made the program
relatively expensive. Finally, it was perceived that
required servicing for the RPVs took too long. (Reed 1979,
62)
The bad reputation was not entirely justified. The
U.S. pressed the Ryan RPVs into service without adequate
testing. Many of the vehicles were lost in accidents which
could have been avoided had the normal test and evaluation
proceedures been followed. (Reed 1979, 62-69) An RPV
exhausted its fuel during a 1962 test, because the engineers
forgot that a jet uses considerably more fuel at low
altitude than it does at high altitude (Wagner 1982, 37).
The secrecy surrounding the RPV programs resulted in
additional mistakes because the engineers were not cleared
to view the results of the reconnaissance missions. In
1965, there were complaints about the quality of the
photography provided by RPVs; further investigation revealed
18
that the Air Force photography lab simply had processed the
film improperly (Wagner 1962, 83).
C. DASH
The Navy started development of the Drone
Anti-submarine Helicopter (DASH) in 1958 as a method of
transporting anti-submarine torpedoes or nuclear depth
bombs to their target. The program suffered from many
operational difficulties, and of the 746 DASHs built, over
half were lost at sea. One of the reasons was that the
operator lacked any feedback from the helicopter. Another
was that DASH was a Bureau of Aeronautics project, but it
operated in a Bureau of Ships enviornment where it lacked a
constituency. According to Norman Friedman, "...reportedly,
some captains preferred to order their drones flown into the
sea rather than operate them." (Friedman 1985, 129)
In contrast to the U.S. experience, the Japanese Navy
purchased seventeen DASHs and did not lose any. The QH-50
helicopters also were operated over Vietnam in an effective
gunfire spotting program, called "Snoopy DASH," made
possible by installing a commercial television camera on the
RPV. (Friedman 1985, 128-29)
D. ISRAELI USE OF RPVs
In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Israelis showed that
RPVs could be used effectively as decoys. Inexpensive,
expendable drones excited the enemy air defense sites by
19
emitting electronic signatures similar to those of threat
aircraft. The enemy fired their SAMs at the drones, and as
the SAM sites were reloading, strike aircraft and Shrike
anti-radiation missiles destroyed the sites' radars. (Wieand
1985, 6)
During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the
Israelis modified this basic technique only slightly and
destroyed a substantial portion of the Syrian air defense
system. Tadrian Mastiff RPVs photographed Syrian missile
sites in the Bekaa valley, and then used ECM equipment to
stimulate the SAM's radar by producing the radar image of
strike aircraft. ESM-equipped Israel Aircraft Industries*
Scout RPVs relayed the location and characteristics of the
signals to an EW-equipped Boeing 707. (Hooton 1984, 337)
When it was time for the June 9th attack, a wave of
air-launched decoys drew the first barrage of missiles.
Almost immediately, 24 F-4 Phantoms fired ARMs at the radar
and control vans. By the end of the first wave's attack, 17
out of 29 sites had been destroyed. This wave was quickly
followed by 40 strike aircraft and further attacks on the
SAM sites. (Interavia 1985, 4) The IAI Scout RPVs then
conducted bomb damage assessment of the sites. (Sweetman
1985a, 1771)
Although Israel's successess with RPVs In the Bekaa
Valley are significant, it must be remembered that the
Israeli military was operating in a familiar area and had
20
the luxury o£ being able to spend three years planning the
mission. The U.S. military almost certainly would not have
such favorable conditions. We are forced to consider the
possibility of operating any prospective RPV in a hostile EW
environment, where the data-links could be jammed. (Gwynne
1987, 40)
E. RENEWED U.S. INTEREST IN RPVs
The Navy and Marine Corps interest in RPVs has been
spurred by lessons learned in Lebanon in 1983, when U.S.
forces were sent into Beruit as part of the multi-national
force. According to Rear Admiral Ronald Marryott, Deputy
CNO for Plans, Policy and Operations:
We had to depend largely on F-14s for reconnaissance
and bomb damage assessment of the USS New Jersey's 16
inch gunfire. Tactical prudence and foul weather often
precluded timely use of F-14s to survey the results of
bomb damage, especially in enemy defended areas.
(Klass 1984, 44)
To remedy this weakness, the Secretary of the Navy,
John Lehman, decided to acquire the Mastiff-3 and the
Pioneer RPVs. Marryott cited the Israelis' "tremendous
success" in using RPVs against Syrian forces "to gather
real-time intelligence on SAM sites... for artillery
spotting, forward area control and battlefield management."
(Klass 1984, 44)
The main reason the Pioneer and Mastiff RPVs were
selected by the Navy was because they could be delivered
quickly. The Navy's original required operational
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capability (ROC) statement was rewritten by Secretary
Lehman In July 1985 to reflect his desire to attain minimum
essential capability as soon as possible. (Sweetman 1985a,
1774)
The ROC was controversial. Losing manufacturers
claimed it was tailored so that only the Israeli system
would be in a position to win. Only one manufacturer,
Pacific Aerosystems Inc., maker of the Heron 26, tried to
compete, and it withdrew, leaving only AAI of Baltimore.
(Dunn 1986, 35) But the Navy did receive an RPV in a
timely manner--the contract was awarded In December 1985,
and by December 1986 the Pioneer was operating from the USS
Iowa (BB 61)
.
F. SOVIET RPVS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Israel and the U.S. are not the only countries
interested in RPVs for gathering reconnaissance. In early
1984, the first Soviet mini-RPV in service in Syria was
observed. Designated the DR-3, It is configured with twin
booms and swept wings, similar to the Israeli Scout and
Mastiff and carries a fixed, non-stabilized television
camera. Interavia (1985, 4) reports that a follow-on RPV,
equipped with a stabilized, steerable camera has been
developed
.
Israeli Defense Forces have shot down at least two
Soviet UR-1 unmanned reconnaissance vehicles. The UR-1 is
an air-launched, high-altitude target drone that Is also
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capable o£ conducting reconnaissance. It may be equipped
with either a television camera, electronic jammers or
electronic intelligence payload. (Wrixon 1986, 689)
The U.S. seems to have learned a lesson from Israel:
RPVs have their place in modern warfare. The U.S. Navy has
taken a multi-track approach to put RPVs into service with
the fleet: The short-range Pioneer has already
conducted operations from the USS Iowa (BB 61); ten Northrop
BQM-74C target drones have been purchased for use in the
development of operational requirements for the proposed
medium-range UAV ("Northrop" 1986, 123); there are
plans to purchase medium-range reconnaissance UAVs and long-
range, long-endurance UAVs.
G. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE UAVs
1. CL-89
Canadair's CL-89 (NATO designation AN/USD-501) is the
UAV that has received the widest acceptance outside the
United States. Nearly 600 CL-89s have been produced, and
they are in service in the militaries of Canada, Italy,
Germany and the United Kingdom. The French Army also has
purchased the CL-89 for use intargetlng for its Pluton
tactical nuclear missiles. (Bulloch 1979, 336-37) The CL-89
is a reusable, fixed wing, turbojet-powered reconnaissance
vehicle, equipped with an IR line-scanner/photo camera. The
UAV is capable of 460 knots and a range of 75 NM
("International" 1987, 178).
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The disadvantages of the CL-89 include its short
range, restrictions on the number of waypoints, the fact
that only one sensor can be carried at a time, and that the
imagery cannot be down-linked; film must be retrieved and
processed. (Wanstall 1986, 387) In addition to the lack of
timeliness, if the vehicle is lost while returning from the
mission, the intelligence is lost.
2. CL-289
Canadair is developing the CL-289, NATO designation
AN/USD-502, in conjunction with Dornier of Germany and SAT
of France. Like its predecessor, the CL-89, the CL-289 is
rocket-launched and parachute recovered, but it will have
approximately twice the range. ("International" 1987, 178)
3. Epervler
Belgium's MBLE (Manufacture Beige de Lampes et de
Materiel Electronique ) produces the Epervier, a short-
range, turbo-jet powered UAV that offers real-time data
transmission. The Epervier can fly at speeds in excess of
350 knots and also is capable of either externally guided or
pre-programmed flight. The Epervier was built to meet NATO
requirements, but lost out to the CL-89 and so was purchased
by the Belgian Army. (Bullock 1979, 337)
4. Mastiff and Scout
The Mastiff was designed by Tadrian Israeli
Electronic industries, Ltd., which has now merged with IAI
(which designed the Scout) to form Mazlat (the name "Mazlat"
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corresponds to the Hebrew .acronym for rpv) . The design
philosophy at Mazlat is that ground equipment is the most
important element in the system. The RPV uses different
payloads for specific missions, but uses common launchers
and ground stations. (Sweetman 1985, 1772-73)
Both the Mastiff and Scout are capable of being
launched by catapult to fly at 90-100 knots on a route which
can be pre-programmed or controlled from the ground
control station. Both RPVs are capable of over seven hours
flight endurance. Between the two vehicles, the RPVs can
accommodate the following payloads: television, photo
camera, FLIR, laser designator or electronic warfare
payload. ("International" 1987, 178)
_5. Mlrach-20
Italy's Meteor Aircraft & Electronics produces the
Mirach-20, a minl-RPV equipped a television camera or FLIR,
for real-time target acquisition, designation, and
surveillance; an over-the-hor izon acquisition radar which
has a range of 50 NM; or a laser designator. The Mirach-20
is capable of 120 knots and six hours endurance
("International" 1987, 178) and may be directed from the
ground or use pre-programmed automatic Omega/VLF navigation.
The "Parrot" version of the Mirach-20 is fully
pre-programmed and therefore does not require a ground
control station. "Parrot" is used for communications relay,
Jamming or electronic support measures (ESM) mission.
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A civilian version, "Gabbiano," is used to drop liferafts at




The Mirach-100 is produced in both target and
reconnaissance versions. More than 150 "100s" have been
manufactured in Italy and under licence in Argentina by
Quimar under the name MQ-2 Bigua. Also, reconnaissance
versions of the Mirach-lOOs have been exported to Iraq and
Libya. The export version is air launched from Agusta A109
and Aerospatiale Dauphin helicopters (Lenorovitz 1987, 53).
The UAV has an endurance of one hour, and a maximum speed of
450 knots ("International" 1987, 178).
The reconnaissance version of the "100" is fully
pre-programmed, and offers low-light television, panoramic
camera, IR line scanner or electronic intelligence payloads
(Wanstall 1986, 390) as well as a wide-band transmitter
with jam-resistant data-link ("Mirach" 1987, 97).
The UAV's navigation system, "Sirah," enables the
vehicle to loiter over a selected area and conduct
surveillance. The Mirach-100 is also reported to have
potential applications as a tatical cruise missile (Jane's
1987, 826)--its payload is estimated to be approximately 88
pounds (Coburn 1986, A-2).
7. Stabileye
The Stabileye RPV, developed by British Aerospace's
Naval Weapons Division, is powered by a pusher-type
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propeller and Is capable of speeds up to 129 knots,
Stabileye can remain aloft four hours and provide real-time
imagery from either an IR line scanner or television camera.
The RPV also has the capability to gather photographic
(film) intelligence. The most unusual aspect of the
Stabileye system is the ability of the groundcontrol station
to control three of the RPVs in flight at the same time.
(Coburn 1985, 1) Stabileye is also capable of serving as a
platform for flight testing payloads (Dunn 1986, 40).
8. Pioneer
The Pioneer RPV Is currently In use by the Navy. To
date it has demonstrated at-sea, daylight launch and
recovery, and, using its television camera, spotting for
naval gunfire. Although Pioneer has conducted operations at
sea, the system is still being perfected and should be




Developmental Sciences' R4E series of RPVs are
operational in the Thai & U.S. armies. The R4E series can
perform day and night real-time reconnaissance, weather
observation, gunfire and close air support, laser
designation, BDA and electronic warfare. (Jane's 1987, 850)
The U.S. Army's R4E-40 Is also capable of being
equipped with a nose-mounted television in conjunction with
underwing rocket launchers. Underwing pods may also
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accommodate extra fuel, chaff, leaflets, flares or
communications jammers. (Jane's 1987, 850)
According to Aviation Week & Space Technology, the
R4E-40 has been used in Thailand and by the U.S. Army in
Central America.
Developmental Sciences refers to the R4E as a
versatile "truck" that does not require an expensive custom-
made payload. It also claims that it can carry a 140 pound
payload for eight hours. It has demonstrated a 9.3 hour
endurance with a Texas Instruments AIR-360/3 FLIR payload
weighing 90 pounds. ("Developmental Sciences Prepares
Skyeye" 1986, 68-76)
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III. SURVEY OF UAV TECHNOLOGY
Before military officers can be prepared to decide the
proper role of UAVs, they must have an understanding of the
associated technology. This chapter is intended for those
who have not studied UAV technology. Those familiar with
the trade-offs associated with UAVs will have less need
to read this chapter.
Just as no single reconnaissance platform is optimal
for all missions, there is no UAV that can meet the needs of
all intelligence users. This chapter addresses the
capabilities and limitations of different aspects of UAV
technology.
A. UAV AIRFRAME TECHNOLOGY
UAVs have been built in a variety of configurations:
fixed wing, rotary wing, vertical/short take-off and landing
(V/STOL), autogyro, and lighter-than-air (LTA) . Each has
advantages and disadvantages, which will be summarized
briefly.
1. Fixed-Wing UAVs
Most of the UAVs under development or currently
operational fall into the fixed-wing category. Fixed-wing
designs have the relative advantages of high
payload/air frame weight ratio, high speed, long range, lower
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manufacturing cost, lower maintenance cost, and higher
reliability and availability. (Coburn 1986, 5-6)
The main disadvantage of fixed-wing designs is that
landing them aboard ship is difficult because of their
relatively high landing speed. The methods most often used
are: net recovery (used to land the Navy's Pioneer aboard
battleships), and parachute recovery (such as the
Mirach-20), which allows the vehicle to land In the water
(Jane's 1987, 826). (See below for further discussion)
2 . Rotorv-Winq UAVs
Deployment of UAVs at sea would be simplified if
complex launch and recovery gear were not required. Also,
shipboard use would be more readily accepted if the vehicle
did not approach the ship at high speed, which increases the
chance that a mishap would damage the ship.
The chief advantage of Remotely Piloted Helicopters
(RPHs) Is that they are capable of taking off and
landing vertically. Unmanned helicopters require relatively
little deck space and launch or recovery equipment. For
these reasons, unmanned helicopters are the UAV type most
adaptable to shipboard use.
The flexibility of the helicopter is paid for,
however, in decreased endurance and range. In general,
fixed-wing aircraft have two to three times the range or
endurance of an RPH. (Coburn 1986, 6) Remotely Piloted
Helicopters would be capable of conducting short
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range reconnaissance (less than 100 NM from the launch
platform), but for longer range missions RPHs would
not be the optimal platform because of their speed,
endurance, and range limitations. The fastest RPH
uncovered in this research was Aerodyne's CH-84, which
evolved from the Navy's QH-50D DASH RPH. The CH-84 cruises
at 135-140 knots and has a maxium speed of 150 knots--less
than one third the maximum speed of the Navy's proposed
(turbojet powered, fixed-wing) medium range UAV. ("Aerodyne"
1986, 108)
3. Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing UAVs
Bell Helicopter Textron/Boeing Vertol is developing
a tilt-rotor design, based on the Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey.
This configuration, called the "Pointer," would combine high
speed and endurance with the capability of being able to
take off and land like a helicopter. The design team
estimates that the Pointer would have a dash speed of 160
knots and endurance of seven hours (at 70 knots). (Greeley
1987, 58)
4. Unmanned Autogyro
An autogyro is a rotorcraft which generates thrust
with a pusher-type propeller and lift with a free-wheeling
(unpowered) rotor. As with the helicopter, the autogyro is
capable of very slow forward flight. Its main advantage as
a UAV may be its ability, with the wind at the proper
magnitude and direction, to remain airborne for very long
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periods of time. A search of the literature revealed only
one unmanned autogyro--the vinten vindicator, which has a
maximum speed of 80 knots and a five hour endurance.
(Coburn 1986, 6-7 & A-2)
5 . Liqhter-than-air UAVs
The idea of 1 ighter-than-alr UAVs has been explored
in the past, and several U.S. designs have flown. The
remotely-piloted blimp "Silent Joe I" was flown successfully
on several occasions during the Vietnam war. This small
(5500 cubic foot) blimp was capable of 15 knots, powered by
dual three horsepower chainsaw engines. (Vittek 1974,
588-89)
Silent Joe II used the 150,000 cubic foot hull of
the Goodyear blimp "Mayflower." Silent Joe II flew nine
successful flights in 1968-69 to demonstrate the concept of
large remotely-piloted blimps. (Vittek 1974, 589)
The Micro Blimp was a 2750 cubic foot, 37 foot long
mini-blimp powered by a four horsepower engine. This
program, carried out in the early 1970's, resulted in
flights as long as ten hours, altitudes up to 5000 feet,
and airspeeds as fast as 30 knots. Heading and pitch
stability were maintained by an autopilot. (Vittek 1974,
589)
The advantages of a llghter-than-alr UAV include:
long endurance, safety (because of slow approach speeds at
landing), less vibration (should result In better imagery),
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quiet when loitering (requires little power), low IR
signature when at low power, and the capability of slow
flight for long endurance station-keeping.
The disadvantages include: slow maximum speed,
vulnerability because of slow speed, the fact that
lighter-than-air UAV is easier to see than smaller UAVs,
restricted range due to its slow speed, the difficulties of
handling a lighter-than-air vehicle on the surface
in high wind, size (when inflated) and its impact on
shipboard stowage and operations.
B. UAV PROPULSION TECHNOLOGY
1. Propeller s and Internal Combustion Engines
The most common mode of propulsion for UAVs
currently deployed or under development is the propeller
driven by an Internal combustion engine. This type of
engine is popular with UAV designers because of its low
price, high reliability, low development risk, and favorable
fuel consumption.
The two-stroke, gasoline-powered engine is the most
commonly used UAV engine. Its disadvantages include the
high level of noise it generates and the volatility of its
fuel. Gasoline presents a problem; U.S. Navy ships had
eliminated gasoline because of the danger of explosion and
fire. (Coburn 1986, 14) The Navy is working on an alternate
fuel program to solve this problem. (Yencha 1987)
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One solution to the fuel problem would be to convert
a rotary engine to run on diesel fuel. Small rotary
engines, such as would be used in UAVs, have a long history
of success and have been run on a wide variety of fuels. The
Curt iss-Wr ight Corporation's RC-2-90 rotary engine has been
modified to run on diesel or JP fuels. Although this engine
is water-cooled, a similar model was built as an aircraft
engine. (Coburn 1986, 14-15)
2
. Turboiets
The primary advantage of turbo jets in UAVs is the
high speed they offer. The trade-off for the high speed
capability is the high fuel consumption and thus shorter
endurance for a given quantity of fuel. This penalty may be
worth paying, however, if the UAV is conducting
reconnaissance against a distant target. In order to
collect intelligence when time is an overriding factor,
medium range (100-300 NM) UAVs must be capable of high
speeds
.
All of the UAVs capable of high speed flight are
turbojet-powered. A partial list would include the
Mirach-100, the Epervier, the CL-89 and the CL-289. All of
these are capable of maximum speeds in excess of 350 knots.
The Navy's proposed medium range UAV will undoubtedly be
turbojet-powered in order to meet the service's operational
requirement of being able to image an enemy airfield 350 NM
from the launch point and have that Imagery available to the
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The vast majority of rotary wing UAVs have coaxial,
counter-rotating rotors. This configuration does not
require a tail rotor, making it safer for shipboard
operations. Current coaxial rotor RPH designs include the




Electric motors are quiet, inexpensive, require
little maintenance, and do not use volatile fuel. These
advantages would seem to make electric motors the ideal
power source for UAVs. The limiting factor is that they
depend on batteries which are relatively heavy for the
amount of power they provide. Battery-powered UAVs are
ideal for missions where slow speed or short range are
acceptable limitations. One UAV that uses an electric motor
for propulsion is the British Aerospace Plover, which serves
as a decoy. (Coburn 1986, A-3)
C. UAV GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
The type of guidance and control system employed
depends on the mission the UAV is designed to accomplish.
If the vehicle is required to fly 200 NM from a ship,
collect photographic intelligence at low altitude, and
return to the ship, the guidance and control system will be
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much more complex than if the mission does not require the
UAV to go beyond the radar horizon.
UAVs can be flown with an autonomous guidance and
control system; they can be designed to fly a pre-programmed
flight profile; or they may be flown under the direct
control of a surface or airborne agent.
1
.
Autonomous Guidance and Control
An autonomous guidance system provides a true
"launch and forget" capability, like that of the Tomahawk
cruise missile. This is attractive because it provides very
accurate navigation without requiring the launch platform to
emit electronic signals to control the UAV. Unfortunately,
such an autonomous UAV requires a very expensive guidance
system; also, an autonomous system often is relatively
heavy, which results in the need to sacrifice
either fuel or sensor payload. (Coburn 1986, 18-19)
2. Pre-Proqrammed Flight Profile
Pre-programmed flight profile with data link update
is the system type most commonly used today. Examples are
too numerous to list, but U.S. systems include the AAI
Pioneer, the Northrop NV-144, and the Teledyne Ryan MQM-34M.
("U.S. RPVs" 1987, 176-77) While a UAV with this type of
guidance and control system is capable of a "launch and
forget" mission, most systems utilize data link updates
to increase the navigational accuracy. Without updates,
navigational errors of two to five percent of range
can be expected. (Coburn 1986, 19)
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Most pre-programmed uavs navigate by dead reckoning,
using Inputs from airspeed, heading and altitude sensors.
The controller commonly tracks the vehicle with radar, often
with the use of an onboard beacon, data linking control
signals to keep the UAV flying the desired track or to alter
the track inflight.
This system, being simpler than an autonomous
control system, requires less expensive or lighter
navigation equipment. The main disadvantage is that radio
silence cannot be maintained by the controlling unit. As a
corollary, the data link can be made secure and jam
resistant, but the trade-offs include cost, weight, and
complexity. There is a distinct possibility that UAVs would
be used in a high threat (electronic warfare) environment,
and if so, a jam resistant link would be required.
3. Direct Control
Unmanned Air Vehicles usually have the capability to
be directed from a control station on the ground, aboard
ship, or in an aircraft. This system of guidance is
quite accurate, and does not require expensive onboard
navigation systems. The disadvantages are that radio
silence is not possible, and for most systems the vehicle
must be within line-of-sight of the control station or relay
unit. (Coburn 1986, 19)
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D. LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SYSTEMS
For UAVs to be widely accepted, the problems of
launch and recovery need to be solved. Launching
and recovering conventional aircraft aboard a carrier is a
complex and dangerous evolution, more so than on land.
Operating UAVs at sea also is more difficult than on land.
The problem of launch and recovery of small and slow
UAVs at sea, including rotary-wing UAVs such as DASH,
has been challenging. However, as the capabilities of UAVs
(range, size, and speed) increase, the launch and recovery
problems generally become greater. This section will deal
only with the problems associated with launch and recovery
of UAVs at sea.
1 . Launch Systems
Launch of UAVs can be accomplished by a variety of
methods, including: rocket, conventional, VTOL, flywheel,
pneumatic, hydraulic, and elastic cord,
a. Rocket
The most common method used to launch sea-based
UAVs is via rail and with rocket assist. This method has
been successfully employed to launch the Pioneer RPVs from
the battleship USS Iowa (BB 61). (Fisher 1987) Under this
system the rocket booster falls away shortly after launch.
Rocket launch from ships has the advantage that complex and
expensive equipment is minimized. Additional advantages are
that rocket launch is very reliable and the time needed to
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set up the Launcher for the next launch is relatively short.
Disadvantages include the necessity for pyrotechnic storage,
corrosive products of combustion, and logistics. (Coburn
1986, 22) This method shows great potential for launching
medium range UAVs that would otherwise require large and
complex launch systems.
b. Conventional
Although conventional take-off and landing of
fixed-wing UAVs at sea is not impossible, almost certainly
it would be impractical because of the need for a large flat
deck. The only ships equipped for this operation are
aircraft carriers and amphibious helicopter carriers
(LHA, LPH, LHD). The deck space on these ships is more
efficiently employed by conventional aircraft. UAV
conventional take-off and landing operations, although
technically possible, would not appear to be the optimal
use of the large deck ships. Also, there are concerns
that conventional aircraft on the flight deck would be
endangered by UAV operations.
c. VTOL
The method of launch and recovery that offers
the greatest flexibility in the deployment of UAVs at sea is
vertical take-off and landing. VTOL vehicles can be
designed to operate from any ship capable of helicopter
operations. This option is worthy of consideration for
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short range UAVs (those with ranges out to 100 NM) or when
their relatively slow speeds are not a hindrance.
d. Pneumatic
Pneumatic launchers use compressed gas to power
a shuttle along a rail to accelerate the vehicle. The
principal drawback is the jerk associated with launch. The
shorter the rail, the greater the jerk: a 660 lb vehicle,
while accelerating to 68 kts, will experience up to 50 g's
if the launcher is five feet long. (The amount of jerk
declines as the length increases: 20 g's with 16 foot rail,
10 g's with 26 feet.) Most UAVs can withstand 15-20 g's at
launch, but sensitive intelligence payloads may not be able





Hydraulic launchers are similar to pneumatic
systems, but use hydraulic fluid to control the jerk at
launch initiation. The disadvantages are that they are
relatively large and complex. (Coburn 1986, 23)
f. Flywheel
A flywheel may be used to provide the energy to
propel the vehicle down the launch rail. The advantages
are: low cost, less jerk from acceleration, constant and
reliable launch velocity, and freedom from ordnance hazards.
The drawback of deploying flywheel launchers aboard ships is




An elastic cord can be used to launch very small
UAVs . Bungees offer the obvious advantages of low cost and
simplicity. Cold weather operations, however, require the
cord, which is two inches in diameter and 20 feet long, to
be heated to above 32°F. The British regularly use this
method at sea to launch the Banshee and Spectre unmanned air
vehicles which weigh approximately 134 pounds. (Coburn 1986,
23)
2. Recovery Systems
The alternatives to recovering UAVs at sea are
to recover them ashore or develop expendable vehicles. Land
recovery is being proposed for the long-endurance UAV
proposed for the U.S. Navy, but this method is not plausible
for short and medium range UAVs. Expendable UAVs would
eliminate the difficulties of recovery, but the cost of each
vehicle would of necessity be much lower than UAVs capable
of multiple flights. The result probably would be that high
resolution imaging systems, secure data links, and accurate
navigation systems would not be affordable in the expendable
UAVs.
Recovery of UAVs at sea can be accomplished by a
number of methods, but none of them is without serious
drawbacks. The methods that this section will analyze are:




U.S. Navy Pioneers and Marine Corp Mastiffs have
been recovered at sea by flying them into nets. The Pioneer
uses a three pole configuration. The poles form a "V,"
and the net is strung across the mouth of the "V." Wires
run from the poles which hold the net to the third pole.
When the RPV flies into the net, the net is allowed to slip
forward on the wires while the vehicle's energy dissipates.
The Mastiff, which landed on the flight deck of the USS
Tarawa (LHA 1), used a more conventional system with two
pendant wires and a barrier net similar to an aircraft
carrier's conventional emergency barricade nets. This
method required precise control as the RPV flared to engage
the hook. Obviously, this two pole method would be suitable
only for ships with large flight decks. (Naval Sea Systems
Command 1987)
Net recovery has the advantage of not having to
carry recovery gear in the UAV (such as parachutes,
parasails, or landing gear), not involving outside units in
the recovery (other ships or helicopters), and avoiding
water landing.
The disadvantages of net recovery are that it is
most suitable for use aboard large surface ships; it is
time-consuming to set up and take down the nets; and the
vehicle is required to fly directly at the ship (risking
collision and subsequent damage to the vehicle and ship).
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Additionally, the ship is not a stable platform (dependent
on sea-state) and it creates wind vortices which the vehicle
may encounter during its vulnerable landing phase.
Additional documented problems which the Navy has addressed
included: software problems with the autoland system, engine
failure, and electromagnetic interference (EMI). (Naval
Sea Systems Command 1987)
As a final note, net recovery appears to be
feasible only for relatively small, slow UAVs
.
b. Parachute
A common method of recovery is by a parachute
which either deploys when commanded by the controller or at
a predetermined time or place. This has serious drawbacks
for use at sea. The vehicle lands in the water, causing
saltwater immersion of the RPV and risking saltwater
contamination. If the vehicle fills with seawater, lifting
it may cause structural damage. Furthermore, water landing
requires that a boat, ship or helicopter recover the UAV.
This can be extremely difficult in high sea-states, adverse
weather, and darkness.
In wartime it could be dangerous for a ship to
slow or stop to pick up a UAV (or to lower a boat to recover
a UAV). Additionally, if a helicopter is used, it
temporarily will be unavailable for its primary mission.
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c. Parafoil
Similar to parachute recovery is parafoil
recovery. Under this method, the UAV deploys a parafoil
at the end of the mission, while the engine continues to
produce power. In tests, using a 40 percent scale model
of the Skyeye remotely piloted vehicle, Developmental
Sciences officials reported parafoil recovery resulted in
lower landing speeds and (implicitly) reduced landing shock
to onboard equipment. ("Developmental Sciences Tests
Parafoil" 1987, 92)
The slower approach speed reduces the
probability of damage to the recovering ship and the UAV,
but this method also has drawbacks. Carrying the
recovery system increases the vehicle's weight or reduces
its payload capacity; wind and ship speed changes complicate
recovery; and a specialized guidance system is probably
needed to direct the vehicle into the net. Removing the UAV
from the net may be difficult, considering the number of
shroud lines associated with parafoils. (Naval Sea Systems
Command 1987)
Parafoil recovery is difficult at night and
in periods of reduced visibility. Additionally, the system
is probably best for recovering relatively small UAVs
.
d. VTOL
VTOL offers the advantages discussed in the
"launch" section of this chapter. VTOL UAVs allow the
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greatest flexibility in deployment at sea; they can
be designed to operate from a large number of ships because
they require so little deck space for launch and recovery.
This option is most attractive for short range UAVs
.
VTOL types include remotely piloted helicopters
and tilt rotor vehicles. The latter shares many of the
capabilities of the former but operates at higher maximum
speeds. Tilt rotor vehicles generally require more deck
space for launch and recovery because of the size of the
propellers
.
e. Helicopter Midair Recovery
The concept of midair retrieval was developed to
recover the film ejected from reconnaissance satellites.
The same idea was used to recover Ryan model 147 RPVs in
Southeast Asia beginning in 1966.
In Vietnam, the original problem recovering the
RPVs was that they often sustained damage from landing in
the rice paddies, the jungle, or the ocean off Da Nang. The
solution was the MARS system; a helicopter equipped with a
grappling hook was used to catch the UAV while it descended
by parachute. Once hooked up, a mechanism freed the drone's
main parachute to float clear. Then the vehicle was reeled
in (after its speed stabilized), until it was stowed about
15 feet below the helicopter. This system allowed vehicles
to be brought back and set down gently (Wagner 1982, 108-09)
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Although the MARS recovery system required the
dedicated use of a helicopter, It was a successful method of
recovery. In extended operation in Southeast Asia, 2655
MARS 'catches' were made in 2745 attempts for a 96.7%
success record. (Wagner 1982, 109)
f. Conventional
While theoretically possible, there seems to be
little enthusiasm for the idea of landing UAVs on ships
conventionally. As discussed above, the Mastiff RPV was
landed on the USS Tarawa (LHA 1) in a way that is similar to
conventional carrier landings. The disadvantages of this
method are that It is necessary to erect a barrier along the
safe parking lines to protect the aircraft parked on deck,
and this method is only suitable for ships with large flight
decks. (Naval Sea Systems Command 1987)
E. SENSOR TECHNOLOGY
Advances in technology have made possible UAV sensors
that allow high-resolution Imagery to be relayed In real or
near real-time to the commander. The following is a summary
of the sensors with which UAVs can be equipped.
1. Television
The obvious appeal of being able to observe the
battlefield (or target) in real-time has made television the
most commonly used UAV sensor for reconnaissance and
surveillance: the Pioneer, Mastiff and Scout RPVs are but a
few examples. Small and light-weight television cameras are
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inexpensive and widely available. The Naval Alt Development
Center has operated a very small television camera
(approximately 2x2x7 inch) from an RPV. A small
television camera with a zoom lens is able to detect objects
such as tanks on the battlefield at approximately 3-5 miles.
(Coburn 1986, 34-35)
Although television offers size, weight and cost
advantages, it suffers from the drawbacks that it is limited
to day, visual meteorological conditions. It is restricted
by the inability to image through haze, smoke, fog or
clouds. (Coburn 1986, 35)
2. EO/IR Sensors
IR sensors have important advantages over television
sensors: they are capable of imaging through haze, dust and
certain fog conditions, and at night. Two common IR sensors
are f oward-looking IR (FLIR) and IR linescanners (IRLS).
Night IR imagery can yield significant intelligence
when it is compared to daytime imagery of the same scene.
IR sensors can provide information in addition to visual
imagery because of the thermal contrast that hot objects
such as tank engines present within a scene. (Coburn 1986,
35)
As computer technology lowers the cost and the size
of Imagery enhancement systems, the Intelligence community
should be able to use them to obtain high-resolution imagery




IR sensors are more readily adaptable to digital data
processing, storage or transmission than conventional
photographic systems; so these sensors are ideal for
real-time data linking of reconnaissance, surveillance or
targeting data to a ground station for analysis and/or
tactical action. (Coburn 1986, 35)
Northrop has proposed its NV-144R to meet the Navy's
requirement for an interim medium range UAV. The proposed
sensor package includes an IR line scanner, the Honeywell
D500. This sensor provides high-resolution imagery in day
or night missions. It has a wide swath, allowing the
vehicle to cover the target in only one pass. The vehicle
would be able to store the imagery if it cannot be passed
back to the operations center immediately. ("Northrop" 1987,
326-27)
3. Radar Sensors
To avoid the effects of weather and darkness,
radar sensors can be used by UAVs . High resolution target
detection and classification may be possible by using high
frequencies such as X, K u , K. and millimeter wave
frequencies. Millimeter wave radars have the advantages of
high resolution, small component size and antenna aperture,
but may be more affected by moisture or rain. (Coburn
1986, 36) One of the attractive characteristics of radar
is that it allows the vehicle to image its target from a
distance. Other imaging sensors, such as IR linescanners,
require the vehicle to overfly or nearly overfly the target,
increasing the probability that the UAV would be shot down.
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IV. EMPLOYMENT OF UAVs AT SEA
Chapter Three outlined the strengths and weaknesses of
UAV technologies. This chapter investigates how UAVs can
collect imagery intelligence (IMINT) to satisfy requirements
for reconnaissance in support of the fleet.
Considering the state of technology, UAVs cannot
totally replace manned reconnaissance aircraft. There are
situations where manned aircraft should be used. For
instance, if the threat to aircraft is low, a manned
aircraft may be an acceptable platform. If the target is at
a great distance, a long-range manned aircraft (perhaps
refueled in flight) may be required to collect Intelligence.
However, if the target is heavily defended, or if the loss
or capture of an aircrew is unacceptable, the UAV would be a
logical choice.
The trend in military affairs over the past century has
been toward more technologically advanced weapons systems.
Today long-range, highly accurate weapons are already in the
inventory and more advanced weapons are planned. But with
the capability to conduct strikes over long ranges comes the
need for highly accurate and timely intelligence.
In modern naval warfare, the advantage goes to the
side that is able to attack effectively first, and the key
to attacking first is to have superior reconnaissance and
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intelligence. Effective fusion of reconnaissance,
surveillance, and intelligence is so important that it must
receive the same emphasis as the delivery of firepower.
(Hughes 1986, 34-39)
Highly accurate anti-ship and land-attack missiles, as
well as strike aircraft capable of pinpoint bombing, are of
little value unless the commander knows where the enemy is.
(Hughes 1986, 39) Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) are
being developed to supplement the existing intelligence
sources. The UAVs will be useful in those cases where
current sources are too ambiguous, slow, dangerous to the
crew, or take resources away from their primary duties.
In time of war it is almost certain that national
Imagery intelligence assets will be overburdened with
tasking. The enemy undoubtedly will put great emphasis on
disrupting and interdicting the handful of
intelligence-gathering assets and their associated command,
control and communication (C 3 ) systems. It may be
possible to prevent this potentially disastrous situation by
deploying the tactical unmanned air vehicles now under
development
.
A. IN SUPPORT OF ANTI -SURFACE WARFARE
The long ranges of anti-ship missiles can be exploited
only with timely and accurate intelligence. Organic
aircraft such as LAMPS helicopters theoretically could
provide some of this intelligence; however, the current
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anti-air threat posed by modern surface ships virtually
rules out the use of helicopters for conducting target
classification and battle damage assessment.
Over-the-hor izon (OTH) targeting and classification are
carried out before the attack, when a target force's air
defense net is strongest. Battle damage assessment is
carried out before the neutralization of the target has been
confirmed. In either case, the use of manned aircraft,
especially helicopters, would be dangerous.
In order to fully utilize the capabilities of
long-range surface-to-surface missiles and strike aircraft,
OTH targeting, classification, and BDA must be provided.
UAVs can supplement or completely replace existing assets in
carrying out these critical missions.
Anti-ship missiles are o£ little value unless the
commander knows where the enemy is. If each side is armed
with long-range missiles, what matters is the productive
range--the range at which a decisive number of weapons may
be expected to hit their targets (Hughes 1986, 39). UAVs
may be used to Increase the productive range of
surface-to-surface missiles by improving OTH intelligence.
UAVs would be most useful when other means of gathering the
intelligence are too ambiguous, slow, or dangerous to the
crew. Also, UAVs would free manned aircraft to carry out
their primary missions.
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BDA is one of the surface action group's greatest
deficiencies since LAMPS helicopters almost certainly would
not be used in a high-risk environment. A UAV such as the
Navy's proposed medium range (MR) UAV system will fill this
gap because of its 300 NM range, its high-resolution imaging
payload, and its real-time data-link capability. But most
importantly, the UAV will not risk the lives of any crewmen.
Table I
COMPARISON OF RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS
MANNED AIRCRAFT LAMPS MR UAV
Crew Risk Yes Yes No
Speed Supersonic Medium High-subsonic
Personnel Cost Very high Very high Medium
Detectability High High Medium
Range Long Short Medium
Airframe Cost Very high Very high Medium
B. IN SUPPORT OF TACTICAL AIR STRIKES
Today's imaging satellites are technically capable of
providing coverage of virtually any target on Earth. These
sensors, however, are not under the control of the Officer
in Tactical Command (OTC), and therefore may not be
available in time to accomplish the mission at hand. This
is further complicated by the fact that satellite coverage
may be impossible at a specific time because of the position
of the sensor, higher priority tasking, or because the
target is obscured by weather.
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The carrier battle group commander does control some
imagery intelligence assets, such as the Grumman F-14A
equipped with the Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Pod System
(TARPS), which was developed in the 1970s as an interim
"fix," although it has ended up being thought of as a
long-term solution. It is capable of conducting minimal
stand-off reconnaissance but lacks a real-time capability.
The Navy plans to introduce a new system in the 1990s
to replace TARPS: the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance
System (ATARS), to provide high-resolution, real-time
imagery from as far away as 350 NM from the launch platform
("Operational" 1986, 48). The major elements of the
ATARS program include the General Dynamics Tactical Air
Reconnaissance System (TARS) and the Unmanned Air
Reconnaissance System (UARS). The TARS, which is now in
full 1scale development, will be installed in Air
Force/McDonnell Douglas RF-4CS and in the MR UAVs; it may
also be installed in some Navy and Marine Corp McDonnell
Douglas F/A-18s. The TARS also includes a tactical ground
station using modular technology developed under the
Advanced Deployable Digital Imagery Support System (ADDISS)
program. The unmanned portion of ATARS is a joint Navy and
Air Force program, with the Navy as lead service for
development of the MR platform and the Air Force developing
the sensor package. (Weinberger 1987, 201)
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The MR UAV, equipped with ATARS sensors, will
provide high-resolution Imagery in high-threat areas,
thereby minimizing the need for manned aircraft. The ATARS
sensor package will be costly when compared to film
reconnaissance systems or TV sensors. It will, however, be
able to deliver to the commander the same high-quality
thermal- imaging and high-resolution optronic imagery as
manned reconnaissance aircraft (Hewish 1987, 1198).
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Unmanned reconnaissance vehicles offer several
advantages in anti-terrorist operations. Most importantly,
imagery can be obtained without risking a flight crew.
We need to collect timely intelligence, but we do not want
target groups to capture personnel In the process. Weather
conditions can prevent satellite or high-altitude
reconnaissance for days at a time. Also, the U.S. may wish
to avoid the diplomatic and political complications
associated with manned overflights. UAVs would be a lower
profile method of gathering the essential imagery.
One of the lessons learned in the Navy operations in
Lebanon, Libya, and the Persian Gulf is that today, Third
World nations often are armed with modern air defenses. The
manned reconnaissance aircraft may be able to avoid




D. IN SUPPORT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
U.S. amphibious assault forces are capable o£ rapid
deployment to distant trouble spots in support of the
national interest. To accomplish this the Navy and Marine
Corps work as a team, with the Navy providing sea lift as
well as support at the location of the landing. As ATARS-
equipped aircraft and UAVs enter the inventory in the 1990s,
the commander of the amphibious assault will be able to see
deep into the amphibious objective area, with great accuracy
and in a timely manner.
With ATARS sensors, the Navy, Marine Corps and Air
Force will be able to share imagery in real-time via the
mobile Joint Services Imagery Processing System (JSIPS).
JSIPS facilities will receive not only Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force UAV imagery in real-time, but ATARS imagery
data-linked from Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s and Air Force
RF-4Cs. JSIPS will allow both shore- and sea-based units to
receive real- and near real-time soft copy imagery products.
According to Rear Admiral J.M. Seely of the Air Warfare
Division in Naval Operations, "[JSIPS] will also allow
reception of both national and strategic sensor products by
the local commander." (Lucas 1987, 398)
Since ATARS is being developed jointly, the
intelligence it provides will be compatible with the
processing facilities of all three services. While a
War-At-Sea scenario is not so dependent on joint operations
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for success, the success of amphibious operations is heavily
dependent on joint operations. ATARS and JSIPS are ideal
for such operations because they allow the rapid exchange
of imagery.
E. IN GENERAL WAR
In a general war, UAVs would relieve tactical aircraft
of the most dangerous reconnaissance missions. If a future
war is fought with only those weapons on hand, valuable
aircraft and crews must not be risked unnecessarily. UAVs
would give the commander the option of having a lower cost
system for reconnaissance, while saving manned aircraft for
missions for which they are optimized.
F. COST-EFFECTIVENESS
UAVs can be constructed to carry out many kinds of
missions, but are UAVs a cost-effective platform for
conducting reconnaissance? Although detailed cost-benefit
analysis of specific UAVs is beyond the scope of this study,
a review of the history of "Buffalo Hunter" missions flown
over Southeast Asia between January 1969 and June 1973 does
provide enough information to give a rough estimate. The
AQM-34L model 147SC was the workhorse of the program,
accounting for nearly half of the missions flown (see
chapter 2). The "SC" flew low altitude photo-reconnaissance
missions, primarily over North Vietnam. The record shows
that the average vehicle flew 7.3 missions. (Wagner 1982,
99-100)
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Using the record from the Vietnam UAVs as a guide,
a rough estimate can be made with respect to the
survivability of UAVs against a hostile air defense system.
For purposes of comparison, assume that a UAV could be
expected to fly seven combat missions. If the cost of the
UAV is one million dollars, then the loss of UAV hardware
(per mission) would be 143 thousand dollars.
If the cost of a single manned aircraft is set at twenty
million dollars, a manned aircraft would have to fly 140
missions against the hostile targets to equal the UAVs
costs due to lost hardware. Therefore, if we expect a
manned aircraft to survive more than 140 reconnaissance,
targeting, and BDA missions against hostile targets, then
the cost of lost hardware would be lower for this
hypothetical aircraft. If we expect the manned aircraft to
average fewer missions before loss, then the UAV would be
the more cost-effective platform.
This analysis is not intended to be a precise estimate
of cost-effectiveness, but is presented for purposes of
comparison only. It assumes the UAV could carry out the
mission as well as the aircraft. It also ignores the
differences in operating expenses, which would tend to be
cheaper in the case of the UAVs . And it figures
cost-effectiveness in terms of airframe and sensors costs
only, ignoring such things as crew training.
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Obviously, the higher the probability that the
reconnaissance platform will be lost to enemy fire, or the
greater the cost difference between the UAV and a manned
aircraft, the more attractive the UAV appears.
Considering that the cost of the Tomahawk missile
(BGM-109) is in excess of two million dollars each, and
their loadout aboard ship is limited, it is easy to
understand that real-time imagery of the target prior to
launch and timely BDA would quickly become cost-effective in
the eyes of the commander. Weapons employment and follow-up
attack decisions require exact, current information about
the prospective target. To maximize the probability that he
will prevail in war at sea, the on-scene commander must have
a superior intelligence system.
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V. CONCLUSION
The reason the enlightened prince and the wise general
conquer the enemy whenever they move and their
achievements surpass those of ordinary men Is
foreknowledge
.
Sun Tzu (Richelson 1985, 6)
Military commanders have long dreamed of being able to
see their enemy over the next hill. Today, the commander
does have access to systems which can provide such a peek at
his enemy. The U.S. Navy OTC in a carrier battle group
currently commands TARPS-equipped F-14As which are capable
of gathering photographic intelligence on film. He may also
ask to receive IMINT support from national sensors.
Although each of these is quite capable, neither is without
drawbacks
.
Unmanned air vehicles are being developed that will fill
the gaps in the current naval imagery collection system.
These vehicles have three predominant advantages: they will
relay the imagery to the tactical commander in real- or near
real-time; they will do so without risking an expensive
manned aircraft and its crew; and they will be operated
under the immediate direction of the on-scene commander.
The key questions are: can UAVs collect IMINT? Can
they operate at sea? Is there a need for the intelligence
they would collect? And are they cost-effective?
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Unmanned air vehicles can gather imagery, uavs
equipped with television cameras or forward looking infrared
(FLIR) sensors have already been deployed, both in the U.S.
and abroad. The U.S. Navy began flying the
television-equipped Pioneer RPV from the USS Iowa (BB 61) in
1986. Since then, in one test, slxteen-inch naval gunfire
was controlled for over two hours using the Pioneer's
television camera and data-link.
Better resolution is available for UAV sensors:
infrared (IR) line scanners are now available, and digital
EO sensors are being developed under the Advanced Tactical
Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS). ATARS' sensors will
offer the OTC high-resolution IMINT in real-time. The
sensors will be deployed on both manned reconnaissance
aircraft and medium-range UAVs, thus offering the tactical
commander the option of using either manned or unmanned
reconnaissance platforms.
UAVs have operated at sea. In addition to the Pioneer
short-range remotely piloted vehicles deployed with the USS
Iowa, during the Vietnam War, the Navy launched and
recovered Ryan model 147SKs from the USS Ranger (CV-61) in a
research and development (R&D) evaluation of the
medium-range photo-reconnaissance UAV. The "Belfry Express"
missions, which were conducted between November 1969 and
June 1970, produced reconnaissance photographs useful for
air order of battle and targeting purposes. Reportedly
60
their quality was superior to that collected by USS Ranger's
manned reconnaissance squadron because the RPVs flew under
the overcast during monsoon weather to provide high quality
low altitude photography. Due to the R&D nature of the
project, the RPVs suffered from reliability problems. When
they did operate properly they provided photography that was
unavailable from other sources. (Channell 1988) The cameras
carried by the AQM-34L (model 147SC), which was similar to
the model 147SK, achieved 3-5 inch resolution on low
altitude missions over Vietnam. (Wagner 1982, 195)
Even though UAVs can operate at sea, and gather IMINT,
the question remains: does the Navy require the Intelligence
they can gather? First, recall that the trend in modern war
at sea has been toward long-range, very accurate and very
expensive missiles. Because of this, the tactical commander
needs timely intelligence. To fully utilize such missiles,
he requires OTH targeting, classification, and BDA.
Although manned reconnaissance aircraft can be used to
carry out these missions, the threat of air defenses is
Increasing. Additionally, surface action groups are
equipped only with LAMPS helicopters which are even more
vulnerable to those defenses.
Tactical air strikes also require imagery intelligence
support. The F-14A TARPS, organic to the carrier battle
group, is a valuable asset. TARPS can collect the necessary
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photographs, but UAVs could gather the same intelligence In
real-time, and without risking the aircraft and crew.
Imagery intelligence support could also come from
national reconnaissance systems, such as satellites,
Lockheed SR-71s or Lockheed TR-ls. These assets are
extremely capable, but they are not subordinate to the
on-scene commander, and therefore may not be able to provide
him intelligence to meet the critical real-time requirements
of tactical operations. UAVs deployed aboard the battle
group can do just that. Moreover, they may be capable of
flying below cloud cover or of loitering for an extended
time to image targets and relay the Intelligence to the
commander as it is imaged.
Are UAVs a cost-effective platform for collecting
imagery intelligence? The cost-effectiveness of UAVs is
impossible to precisely gauge because one of their chief
advantages is that they save lives; yet it is clear that as
missiles such as Tomahawk and as tactical strike and
reconnaissance aircraft become more costly, the
attractiveness of UAVs becomes incontrovertible.
Apart from the humanitarian aspect, the political
advantage of gathering IMINT without risking the death or
capture of American servicemen looms large if military
actions similar to the strikes on Libya or Lebanon need to
be carried out in the future. In situations where American
national leaders insist on an absolutely minimal risk of
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aircrew death or capture, UAVs will be extremely valuable.
A precise appraisal of UAV value is practically impossible
because it requires the quantification of intangibles such
as the cost of a flightcrew's life, the impact on national
prestige of a failed or errant attack, and the limitations
on foreign policy imposed by the prospect or consequences of
captured American servicemen.
The deployment of UAVs capable of providing high-
resolution IMINT in real-time will not come without cost.
But in a world of finite resources, UAVs will also help
conserve expensive tactical aircraft which would otherwise
be ordered to overfly heavily defended targets.
Additionally, expensive surface-to-surface missiles will be
conserved because of the UAVs ability to conduct targeting,
classification and bomb damage assessment.
While UAVs are not a panacea, they are capable of
filling gaps in the existing IMINT system. The fact that
they cost a small fraction of the price of a tactical
aircraft and that they do not endanger the lives of crewmen
means that they are ideal for high-risk missions.
This thesis can only serve as a starting point in the
debate over how UAVs can be used to improve the Navy's IMINT
system. Even as naval civilian and uniformed leaders must
make difficult budgetary decisions, we should carefully
reflect on our national military strategy and the trends in
modern warfare.
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The latter seem to be toward more accurate weapons
systems and a faster pace of war. Such weapons will require
an extremely effective intelligence system. UAVs can assist
the tactical commander by flying into the most heavily
defended areas and reporting the situation in real- or near
real-time. If future wars are fought at a fast pace, with
very high rates of weapons depletion, ships may not have
time to reload their magazines, and commanders will want to
make every round count. Furthermore, as the costs of
weapons rise along with their Increased capability, it will
become even more important to increase the effectiveness of
each strike. In a fast-paced war at sea, with both sides
armed with long-range missiles, it will be important not
only to strike first, thereby preventing the enemy from
firing his weapons, but to follow up strikes with
reconnaissance so that the OTC can make an informed decision
about additional strikes.
One way of accomplishing this is to improve the
intelligence system that provides the classification,
targeting and battle-damage-assessment to the OTC. If
strike weapons are costly and limited in number, the
pressure will be on the intelligence system to assist the
tactical commander in deciding how best to employ those
finite assets. UAVs can provide this intelligence.
It has been shown that UAVs already have been used in
combat to conduct missions that were too dangerous or that
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could not be carried out by manned aircraft. Currently, the
Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps are developing UAVs which
will be able to fly as far as 350 NM from the launch point
and data-link imagery to the OTC in real- or near-real time.
Furthermore, this imagery will be comparable in quality to
that gathered by manned reconnaissance platforms.
This thesis concludes that UAVs should not replace
manned reconnaissance platforms, but they are most
cost-effective when the threat to the aircraft is high.
UAVs have not enjoyed consistant funding. In time of war,
they have been in demand; but in peacetime, when their
specialized, high-risk missions are not conducted, funding
has disappeared. However, by continuing to fund UAVs in
peacetime, and by deploying them as soon as possible, we
will be prepared to save lives while putting ordnance on
target from the start of any future war.
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